Abstract A lump-sum intergovernmental transfer has a "price effect", as well as an "income effect", because it allows the recipient government to reduce its tax rate, which lowers its marginal cost of public funds, while still providing the same level of public service. This reduction in the effective price of providing the public service helps to explain the "flypaper effect"-the empirical observation that a lump-sum grant has a much larger effect on spending than an increase in personal income. Contrary to the assertions of Mieszkowski (Modern Public Finance, 1994) and Hines and Thaler (J. Econ. Perspect. 9:217-226, 1995), a model of a benevolent local government financing its expenditures with a distortionary tax predicts flypaper effects from lump-sum grants that are similar to those observed in many econometric studies.
First, general lump-sum and specific lump-sum grants have the same effects on grantee spending because they have only an income effect. Second, open-ended matching grants have a greater stimulatory effect on grantee spending than equivalent lump-sum grants because they have both income and substitution effects. Third, general lump-sum grants have similar (or the same) stimulatory effects on grantee spending as an equivalent rise in income in the community. 1 The first conclusion-lump-sum transfer does not have a price effect-and the third conclusion-equivalent spending effects from lump-sum grant and personal income increases-are not valid when a recipient government uses distortionary taxes to finance its expenditures, while the second conclusion-"a greater expenditure stimulative effect from matching grants"-continues to hold.
Demonstrating that lump-sum grants have a "price effect" is important because much of the literature on intergovernmental grants continues to describe lump-sum intergovernmental transfers as only having an "income effect". See, for example, the recent survey paper by Shah (2007, Table 1 .1, p. 10). We show that a lump-sum grant has a price effect when a recipient government uses distortionary taxes to finance its spending because the effective price of its public services is the product of its marginal cost of public funds (MCF) and the marginal production cost of the service. When a subnational government receives a lump-sum transfer, it can reduce its tax rate and still provide the same level of service. At the lower tax rate, the MCF will, under plausible assumptions be lower and, therefore, the effective price of providing the public service is reduced. The price effect of a lump-sum grant will be greater when the ratio of the lump-sum transfers to the own-source tax revenues collected by the subnational government is higher and when the subnational government's MCF is higher. We show that while lump-sum grants have a price effect as well as an income effect, a revenue-neutral switch from a lump-sum grant to a matching grant would increase the provision of the public service by the subnational government.
For plausible parameter values, the reduction in the effective price of public services caused by lump-sum grants can be quite large and can explain the flypaper effect-the empirical observation that a lump-sum grant has a much larger effect on spending than an increase in personal income. As noted above, the conventional model of intergovernmental grants assumes that a benevolent subnational government uses lump-sum taxes to finance its expenditures and predicts that lump-sum grants should have the same impact on spending as an equivalent increase in personal income. See Bradford and Oates (1971) . Therefore, the flypaper effect was labeled an "anomaly" in a widely cited paper by Hines and Thaler (1995) , and various alternative explanations have been put forward to account for it, including fiscal illusion on the part of voters and the control exerted by expenditure-maximizing bureaucracies. See Dollery and Worthington (1996) , Bailey and Connolly (1998), and Gamkhar and Shah (2007) for surveys of the empirical evidence on the flypaper effect and the various attempts that have been put forward to explain it.
Hamilton (1986) was the first to point out that a flypaper effect can arise because subnational governments typically use distortionary taxes to finance at least part of
